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Abstract. The major perspective of this paper is to provide more evidence into the empirical 
determinants of capital structure adjustment in different macroeconomics states by focusing 
and discussing the relative importance of firm-specific and macroeconomic characteristics 
from an alternative scope in U.S. This study extends the empirical research on the topic of 
capital structure by focusing on a quantile regression method to investigate the behavior of 
firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables across all quantiles of 
distribution of leverage (total debt, long-terms debt and short-terms debt). Thus, based on a 
partial adjustment model, we find that long-term and short-term debt ratios varying 
regarding their partial adjustment speeds; the short-term debt raises up while the long-term 
debt ratio slows down for same periods. 
Keywords. Capital structure, Quantile regression, Macroeconomy, Firm characteristics, 
Econometry, Total debt, U.S., Panel data, Hausman test, Fixed effects model, Unbalanced 
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1. Introduction 
eneral (and economic) managers with a view to maximize profits must 
make two fundamental choices: the choices of investment and capital 
structure. Myers (2001) supported that there is no single theory that could 
explain the lending leverage of companies, and there is no reason to expect one. 
However, many academics have attempted to correlate variables with the capital 
structure, with the prevailing theories being the pecking-order theory, the trade-off 
theory, the theory of representation costs and the market-timing theory. The early 
studies, yet, had no obvious effect. For example, the trade-off theory supports that 
there is a positive correlation between debt leverage and profits. In contrast to their 
anticipations, Rajan & Zingales (1995) underpin a negative correlation between 
leverage and profits. Lemmon & Zender (2010) identified a positive relation 
between the lending leverage and the market value index per book value. On the 
other hand, Sinan (2010) found that the lending leverage is negatively correlated 
with the market value index per book value. Myers’s point of view is that there is 
no single theory that can explicate the choice of capital structure from companies 
and that the factors fluctuated depending on the country and the period 
investigated, strengthened by these contradictory results. In general, the 
applicability of the capital structure theories enlists majestically on the research 
agenda, and a growing number of country-specific studies have extended the 
investigations. 
 
aa† University of Patras, Cultural Heritage and New Technologies Department, Patras, Greece. 
. +306951494557 
. kaloudisa@upatras.gr 
b University of Patras, Cultural Heritage and New Technologies Department, Patras, Greece. 
. +306988254810 
. dtsolis@upatras.gr 
G 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 5(1), A. Kaloudis, & D. Tsolis, p.1-17. 
2 
 In this context, Prowse (1990) examined the agency problem between debt 
holders and shareholders of Japanese and U.S. firms. Leverage ratios of U.S. firms 
are negatively related to the enterprises potential engagement in risky investments 
whereas Japanese debt ratios show no such relation. Evidence is consistent with the 
concept that agency problem is alleviated to a superior degree in Japan than in the 
U.S. Rajan & Zingales (1996) analyzed the determinants of capital structure by 
investigating decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries and 
provide evidence that in an aggregate level, firm leverage in U.S. is similarly 
correlated in other G-7 countries in a cross-section sample. Moreover, estimations 
indicate that leverage in U.S. firms is positively related to asset tangibility and firm 
size, and negatively related to market-to-book ratio and profitability, followed by 
more recent international evidence. (Booth, 2001, and De Jong, 2008).As described 
by Graham (1996), by using annual data from more than 10,000 firms from 1980 to 
1992, it is tested whether the progressive use of debt is correlated positively to 
simulated firm-specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses, 
alternative minimum tax and investment tax credits.  The author provides evidence 
which point out that high-tax-rate firms issue less low-tax-rate counterparts than 
their debt. In his findings, Wald (1999), in an empirical study, examined the factors 
which are correlated with the capital structure in United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Japan and France and the results illustrate similarities in leverage among 
all countries. However, differences appear in the correlation between long-term 
debt to asset ratios and profitability, size and growth. Specifically, the author found 
a negative correlation between leverage and profitability as prior researches of 
Rajan & Zingales (1996), through a regression analysis in a total sample of 3,300 
firms in United States. The findings of this study suggest links between varying 
choices in capital structure across countries as well as legal and institutional 
differences. Cheng, & Shiub (2006) using a sample of firms across 45 countries 
including U.S., found that investor protection plays an important role in the 
determinants of capital structure: ﬁrms in countries with better creditor protection 
have higher leverage, while ﬁrms in countries where shareholder rights are better 
protected use more equity funds. Huang & Ritter (2009) examined time-series 
patterns of external ﬁnancing decisions and illustrated that when the cost of equity 
capital is low, publicly traded U.S. ﬁrms fund a larger quantum of their ﬁnancing 
deﬁcit with extraneous equity. The historical values of the cost of equity capital 
have long-lasting impact on capital structure of the ﬁrms through their effect on 
ﬁrms’ historical ﬁnancing decisions. The authors also present an alternative and 
innovated econometric technique to deal with biases regarding estimates of the 
speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The research provides evidence that 
ﬁrms adjust toward target leverage at a passable speed, with a half-life of 3.7 years 
for book leverage, similarly after controlling of the conventional determinants of 
firm fixed effects and capital structure. Consequently, with the market timing 
theory, Rongbing Huang and Jay R. Ritter found that when the expected ERP is 
lower, ﬁrms fund a larger proportion of their ﬁnancing deﬁcit with net external 
equity. As described by Gropp & Heider (2010) in a sample of large U.S. and 
European Banks found that unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects are 
eventually the most important determinants of banks’ capital structures and that 
banks’ leverage converges to bank specific, time-invariant targets. However, there 
is a significant number of references in literature, focused principally on samples in 
United States (Cespedes, Gonzalez, & Molina, 2010; Cook, & Tang, 2010; 
Öztekin, & Flannery, 2011; Gill, Biger, & Mathur, 2011). Cespedes, Gonzalez, & 
Molina (2010) evaluated the capital structure determinants of Latin American firms 
by using a sample of seven countries. Latin American firms have high ownership 
concentration, which is a fact that creates an ideal setting to study how ownership 
concentration explains firms' capital structure. This study finds a positive relation 
between leverage and ownership concentration. Furthermore, the study indicates a 
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positive relation between leverage and growth. Thus, firms that are larger have 
more tangible assets whereas less profitable firms are more leveraged. 
A key element of this paper is the utilization of limited and unlimited relapses 
to distinguish the firms impact from the firm-specific and macroeconomic 
variables. The outcomes demonstrate that due to firm-specific characteristics 
varieties occur. 
Cook, & Tang (2010) by using two dynamic partial adjustment capital structure 
models estimated the impact of several macroeconomic factors on the speed of 
capital structure adjustment toward target leverage and found evidence which 
confirm that firms adjust their leverage toward target faster in optimal 
macroeconomic states compared to weak macroeconomic states. Hall et al., (2006) 
demonstrated that long-term obligations are connected decidedly to the resource 
structure and firm size and contrarily to age; fleeting obligations are connected 
adversely to benefit, resource structure, size and age and emphatically to 
development. A huge variety crosswise over enterprises was found in a large 
portion of the illustrative variables. Öztekin, & Flannery (2011), as Cook, & Tang 
(2010), compare firms' capital structure adjustments across countries and 
investigate whether institutional differences are appropriate to explain the variance 
in estimated adjustment speeds. Authors in consistence with the dynamic Trade-off 
theory, found that legal and financial traditions significantly correlate with firm 
adjustment speeds. Sinan (2010) demonstrated that there is a positive correlation 
between leverage and profitability. This is because, when financial leverage is 
used, changes in earnings before interest and taxes bring greater changes in profit 
before disposal per share. High leverage simply means that small changes in sales 
incur disproportionately larger changes in the operating profit and vice versa. More 
recently, Gill, Biger, & Mathur (2011) selected a sample of 272 American firms 
listed on New York Stock Exchange for a three-years period, from 2005 to 2007. 
Empirical results show positive relationship between total debt to total assets and 
profitability in the service industry, in contrast with Rajan & Zingales (1996) 
findings. On the contrary, in the manufacturing industry the results indicate three 
positive relationships between long-term debt to total assets and profitability, short-
term debt to total assets and profitability, and total debt to total assets and 
profitability. In the findings of Mokhova & Zinecker (2013), the relationship 
examination between the capital structure and the sovereign FICO scores 
demonstrates the distinctions in appraisal valuation by rating firms, which can be 
clarified by various financial variables and their weights in the connected default 
likelihood models. The quality of the connection between the capital structure and 
the FICO assessments additionally relies on the measures of the capital structure 
and the nation’s specifics. Koksal & Orman (2015) argued that the trade-off theory 
gives a superior portrayal of the capital structures of every single firm to the 
pecking-order theory. In addition, the trade-off theory appears to be especially 
appropriate for comprehending the financing decisions of extensive private firms in 
the non-producing sector and when the financial environment is generally steady. 
The study’s conclusion is that the trade-off theory is a superior system to the 
pecking-order theory.  
However, some authors examined the capital structure determinants with the 
method of quantile regression in order to study the effect of leverage in firms 
across different quantiles. Fattouh, Harris & Scaramozzino (2008) demonstrated 
that, by presuming upon the distribution of leverage, conditional quantile 
regression methods generate new information about the most appropriate choice of 
leverage ratio in a UK companies sample finding that not only the estimated effect 
of the regressors is different at different quantiles of the distribution, but also that 
the effect of a variable changes sign between low leveraged and high leveraged 
ﬁrms. Margaritis & Psillaki (2010) investigated the relationship between leverage 
and firm efficiency. Authors considered both the effect of leverage on firm 
performance as well as the reverse causality relationship and tested the attitude of 
leverage across different quantiles using a sample of 12,240 New Zealand firms. 
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Theyfound evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of the Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) agency cost model using quantile regression analysis. 
We try to determine which of capital structure theories (trade-off theory, agency 
cost theory and pecking-order theory) is the most suitable for explaining 
empirically the capital structure of US firms.  Therefore, the tasks that are going to 
be carried out in this study are the analysis of the variables for each of the theories 
and the identification of the one that best explains the index of long-term debt 
leverage, short-term debt leverage and total debt leverage. In this paper the 
applicability of capital structure theories in the US economy is examined by a 
panel data empirical model that uses their key variables. Using panel models of 
random or fixed effects, it is possible to control the implications of companies’ 
non-observable individual effects on the estimated parameters.  The period of 
analysis spans from 1970 to 2014, incorporating different market phases and 
various stock market crashes and booms.  The years before the financial crisis were 
characterized by an excessive accumulation of exposures of US firms in relation to 
their own funds (leverage).   
We find a negative correlation between leverage and the profitability and the 
firm’s size. Our results imply that firms source finance in a manner consistent with 
Myers’s (1984) pecking-order theory. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation 
between tangible assets and leverage but a negative correlation between liquidity 
and leverage, which is also consistent with Myers’s (1984) pecking-order theory.  
The capital requirements for covering risks are essential to ensure sufficient own 
funds to cover unexpected losses. However, the crisis has shown that these 
requirements alone are not sufficient to prevent U.S. firms from taking excessive 
and unsustainable leverage risk. This means that U.S. firms do not increase or 
reduce their debt with their investment opportunities, as shown in Kester (1986)’s 
study. Additionally, we observe a negative correlation appears between leverage 
and firm size.  This means that U.S. firms do not increase their external debt with 
their investment opportunities but also do not direct internal financing and 
additional borrowing, but that exposes them to large systemic risk.  It is also 
demonstrated that deficits are financed with debt, and similar results were found by 
Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) for US companies.  
None of the above studies combine firm specificities with adjustment speed in 
capital structure determination and research the issue of macroeconomic variables 
vs firm-specific characteristics in different economic states with a quantile 
regression approach. The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the relative 
importance macroeconomic variables vs firm-specific characteristics when the 
macroeconomic conditions change. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the applicability 
of capital structure theories to US firms with an extensive data set in this period. 
Our study differs from previous studies in literature in many ways.  We propose to 
make a number of contributions to the literature. 
This paper, thus contributes on the recent of capital structure dynamic 
determination in the following ways: we examine which variables affect the 
leverage of a very large data of the US firms for the first time with the largest 
number of data, the research is expanded to cover almost all business categories. 
The result is the increment of the sample to 28793 companies and 340865 
observations, which is the largest sample size in the research literature concerning 
the economy of the United States (US), the period of analysis is the longest so far 
in the research literature; in addition, the previous studies are scattered and the 
approach methodology is quantile regression in a fixed effects model in different 
macroeconomic states. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
andthe methodological approach, the methodology set and some preliminary 
statistics. Section 3 presents and the Model. Section 4 provides the empirical 
results. 
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2. Methodology and data 
For the beginning we examine if our panel data model is a fixed or random 
effects model. Through Hausman test we found that our model is a fixed effect 
model. Panel data models allow us to control the implications of companies’ non-
observable individual effects on the estimated parameters. For the best of our 
knowledge panel data are the most suitable to examine a dynamic phenomenon that 
changes cross time in comparison with time series or cross-section data which 
neither express dynamic relations nor produced estimates are highly accurate due 
to the multicollinearity existence. Furthermore, panel data provide us estimates of 
raised accuracy while they used more than the double number of total observations 
that is used in both assessment with the times series or cross section data. Finally, 
with panel data, there is the possibility to control the invariable elements that 
change between firms but are stable over time. To decide the most appropriate 
model between fixed or random effects model, through Hausman (1978) test, the 
fixed-effects model is the most appropriate for our research. 
 
3. The estimation methodology 
3.1. The quantile regression in panel data approach  
Our approach is based on quantile regressions, which estimate the effect of 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable at different points of the dependent 
variable’s conditional distribution.  
Quantile regressions were originally presented as a ‘robust’ regression method 
which permits for estimation where the typical hypothesis of normality of the error 
term might not be strictly satisfied (Koenker & Bassett, 1978);  
This method has also been used to estimate models with censoring (Powell, 
1984, 1986; Buchinsky, 1994, 1995). 
Recently, quantile regressions have been used simply to get evidence about 
points in the distribution of the dependent variable further than the conditional 
mean (Buchinsky, 1994, 1995; Eide & Showalter, 1997). We use quantile 
regressions to observe whether the effects of factors Is differentiated across the 
‘quantiles’ in the conditional distribution of dependent variable 
 As described by Koenker & Bassett (1978), the estimation is done by 
minimizing 
 
K
Min
R  { : t tt t y 

 
  𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡𝛽 +  (1 − 𝜃) 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡𝛽 
𝑡∈{𝑡:𝑦𝑡<𝑥𝑡𝛽}
 
 
where yt , is the dependent variable, xt is the k by 1 vector of explanatory 
variables, β is the coefficient  vector and Θ is the estimated quantile. The 
coefficient vector b will differ depending on the particular quantile being 
estimated. 
 
3.2. Interpretation of quantile regression estimation 
Since the 𝜃𝑡𝑕conditional quantile of y given x is given by 
 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝛩 𝑦𝑖 𝑥𝑖   = 𝑥𝑖 𝛽𝜃 , 
 
its estimate is given by, 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃(𝑦𝑖 𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽 𝜃  . 
As one rises θ continuously from 0 to 1, one drops entire conditional 
distribution of y, conditional on x. In practice, given that any data set contains only 
limited number of observations, only a finite number of quantile estimates will be 
statistically distinct, although this number can be quite large. 
Consider the partial derivative of the conditional quantile of y with respect to 
one of the regressors, say j, namely 
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𝜕𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝛩 𝑦𝑖 𝑥𝑗   𝑥𝑖 /𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑗  
 
This derivative is to be interpreted as the marginal change in the 𝜃𝑡𝑕conditional 
quantile due to marginal change in the 𝑗𝑡𝑕  element of x. 
If 𝑥  includes 𝐾  distinct variables, then this derivative is given by 𝛽𝜃𝑗 , the 
coefficient on the 𝑗𝑡𝑕  variable. One should be careful in interpreting this result. It 
does not suggest that a person who happens to be in the 𝜃𝑡𝑕  quantile of the 
conditional distribution will also find himself/herself at the same quantile had 
his/her x changed. 
 
3.3. Quantile regress,on in panel data 
Like in the case of the conditional mean, for the estimation of the conditional 
quantile equation we use different methods when employing panel data than those 
used for cross-sectional or time series data. Similar to conditional the mean, we use 
the FE model for quantile regression for the estimation of the conditional quantile. 
Since the FE model is the less restrictive model and we do not have to assume the 
absence of correlation between regressors and individual effects, we consider that 
FE is the most appropriate model for this application. Additionally, there is no 
generally agreed upon notion regarding random effects for quantile regression 
applications. On the other hand, there exist penalized methods (Koenker, 2004) that 
are used for longitudinal data that improve the efﬁciency of the FE model. 
However, they mostly suited for cases where there are just few observations 
(usually less than 5) of one of the ‚two-way‛ effects, time or individuals. 
Nevertheless, no theoretical background has been developed yet to use ‚two-way‛ 
penalized methods. Therefore, even if it was more appropriate, it would be 
infeasible to use. In cases where we needed to improve the FE model’s efﬁciency 
we could estimate a model where quantile regressions are estimated simultaneously 
by imposing identical individual effects for every quantile and minimizing the 
equation (Koenker, 2004). 
We deliberate a panel QR model with individual eﬀects 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖0 𝜏 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽0 𝜏 + 𝛧
′
𝑖𝑡𝛾0 𝜏 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  𝜏 , 𝑖 = 1,… . . ,𝑁 , 𝑡 = 1,… . . ,𝑇.  (1) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the scalar response for the i-th individual at t-th time period, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and 𝑧𝑖𝑡  
are 𝑑𝑥 ×  1  and 𝑑𝑧 ×  1  vectors of covariates, 𝛼𝑖0 𝜏  is the ﬁxed eﬀect for 
𝑖𝑡𝑕 individual. 
For a brace of observations   𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡 ), 𝑡 ≥ 1}   ,we permit time necessity in a 
given individual, but accept independence across individuals. 
We assume that the 𝜏𝑡𝑕quantile of the error 𝑒𝑖𝑡  𝜏 = 0. 
Under this normalization situation, the 𝜏𝑡𝑕conditional quantile of the response 
given covariates is written as 
 
𝑄𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝜏 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖0 𝜏 + 𝑥0𝑖𝑡𝛽0 𝜏 + 𝑧0𝑖𝑡𝛾0 𝜏 . 
 
The quantile speciﬁc error 𝑒𝑖𝑡  𝜏  illustrates the distance between the response 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  and its 𝜏𝑡𝑕  conditional quantile. We allow the marginal densities of 𝑒𝑖𝑡  to be 
distinct at diﬀerent time periods. Let 𝑓𝑡 𝑒  be the marginal density of 𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 
𝑓 𝑒 =  𝑇−1  𝑓𝑡 𝑒 𝑇𝑡=1 . 
We use a vector notation α(τ) to signify a set of ﬁxed eﬀects  𝛼1 𝜏 ,… ,𝛼𝛮 𝜏  . 
The QR coeﬃcients are estimated by 
 
 𝑎  𝜏 ,𝛽  𝜏 , 𝛾  𝜏  = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min𝑎 𝜏 ,𝛽 𝜏 ,𝛾 𝜏   𝜌𝜏 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖 𝜏 − 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽 𝜏 −
𝛵
𝑡=1
𝛮
𝜄=1
𝛧′ 𝑖𝑡𝛾 𝜏  .         (2) 
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𝜌𝜏 𝑢 = 𝜏 −   𝑢 ≤ 0  , u is the check function as in Koenker & Bassett (1978). 
3.4. The model 
 
𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎
𝑐𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
𝑐𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽𝛸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1𝐶𝑡
+ 𝛾𝛭𝑡−1 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑀𝑡−1𝐶𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡  
 
Where 𝑎 is the constant term, 𝑎𝑖  is the unobserved heterogeneity of firm 𝑖,𝑋 =
 𝑋1 ,… . ,𝑋𝐾 
′  and 𝑀 =  𝑀1 ,… ,𝑀𝐽 
′
are (column) vectors of firm specific and 
macroeconomic variables respectively, 𝛽 ∗= (𝛽 ∗1 , . . . ,𝛽 ∗𝐾)  is the (row) 
coefficient vector of firm-specific variables and 𝛾 ∗= (𝛾 ∗1 , . . . , 𝛾 ∗𝑗 )  the (row) 
coefficient of the macroeconomic variables 
Cook & Tag (2010) examine the above model using panel data in a sample of 
US firms over the period 1977-2006 and expand further the model by including a 
dummy variable for the good and bad states of the economy and interacting it with 
the lagged debt ratio. 
We set dummy variable for good (growth) and bad (recessionary) 
macroeconomic states, and we follow the model of Cook & Tang (2010) in a fixed 
effect quantile regression approach to capture the fluctuations of the regressors 
across all over the distribution of total, short-terms and long-terms debt. 
Where 𝑐𝑡  takes value 1 if gdp growth rate is negative and 0 otherwise. So the 
effects of the lagged debt ratio, the lagged firm-specific variables and the lagged 
macroeconomic variables on the debt ratio are given by 𝛿, 𝛽, and 𝛾 in the good 
state and 𝛿 + 𝛿𝑐 ,𝛽 + 𝛽𝑐 ,𝛾 + 𝛾𝑐  in the bad state 
 
3.5. The variables 
Proxies for leverage: The leverage variable is differentiated between three types 
which are the total debt ratio (TDR), the long-term debt ratio (LDTR) and the 
short-term debt ratio (STDR) in order to capture all angles from prior literature. 
This categorization of leverage allows us to investigate the influences of debt 
maturity structure across macroeconomic states. 
The calculation of ratios participated by following the standard practice by 
measuring debt ratios as the book value of interest-bearing debt to total assets. 
Therefore, TDR is firm’s short-term plus long-term book value of debt divided 
from total assets. 
LTDR is long-term debt divided from total assets and STDR is the short-term 
debt divided from total assets. 
Firm-specific factors: The firm-specific factors are represented by the standard 
set of capital structure determinants. 
Size (SIZE) expected to be positively correlated with debt levels. Larger firms 
may be able to reduce the transaction costs associated with long-term debt 
issuance. Public corporate debt usually trades in large blocks relative to the size of 
an equity trade, and most issues are at least 100 million dollars in face value to 
provide liquidity. Larger firms may also have a better chance of attracting a debt 
analyst to provide information to the public about the issue. Another possibility is 
that larger firms have more dilute ownership, and thus less control over managers. 
Managers may then issue less debt to decrease the risks of bankruptcy that involve 
personal loss (see Friend & Lang, 1988 and Friend & Hasbrouck, 1988). Marsh's 
(1982) survey concludes that large firms more often choose long-term debt while 
small firms choose short-term debt. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
total sales. 
Asset structure (AS) is expected to be positive or negative correlated with debt 
levels. The positive sign reflects the guarantees that banks require from companies 
in order to grand loans.  
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Regarding to Myers (1977) companies with growth potential are assumed as 
riskier and in the future, they will tend to have lower leverage. On the contrary, it is 
more likely that firms with high growth opportunities exhaust internal funds and 
seek external financing (Michaelas et al., 1999). As a consequence, growth (GR) 
and leverage relation can be either negative or positive, with GR being measured as 
the annual rate of change in sales. 
In view of the pecking order theory, SMEs financing decisions follow in general 
a hierarchy, preferring debt over equity and internal over external financing 
(Michaelas et al., 1999, Daskalakis & Psillaki, 2008; Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2009). 
Thus, it is expected that profitability (PR) should be negatively related to debt and 
be measured as earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
It should be noted that tax reflections are of little attention for SMEs (Pettit & 
Singer, 1985), since these firms are less likely to generate high profits and as a 
result less likely to use debt or non-debt items for tax shields. Nevertheless, 
considering the given higher levels of difficulty for small firms in order to access 
debt financing, we can deduce that the use of non-debt tax shields (NDTS) could 
be viewed as their main alternative for reducing any tax burdens. Hence, it is easily 
inferred that non-debt tax shields will be negatively related or not related to debt 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). NDTS is calculated as the ratio of total depreciation 
expenses to total assets. 
On the other hand, riskier firms (RISK) are to confront higher levels of 
difficulty in accessing debt financing (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988). Consequently, it is expected a negative relationship between 
leverage and risk. As far as RISK calculation is concerned, we consider a three-
year rolling window of the earnings standard deviation before interest and taxes. 
Concerning the significance of trade credit (NTCS) as a source of short-term 
financing, particularly for SMEs, it is derived that it is well-documented (Ng et al., 
1999; Asselbergh, 2002; Guariglia & Matut, 2006). Two alternative hypotheses 
exist in the literature regarding the use of trade credit: the first one is the 
substitution hypothesis and the other one is the complementarity hypothesis. 
Moreover, evidence shows that trade credit acts as complement, during times of 
tight money, rather than substitute to bank credit, providing support for the 
redistribution effect (Love et al., 2007; Casey & OToole, 2014; Psillaki & 
Eleftheriou, 2015).  Hence, we anticipate either a negative or a positive relationship 
of trade credit before the crisis that follows the substitution or the complementarity 
hypothesis respectively, and during the crisis a positive relationship. As for NTCS, 
the net-trade approach of Love et al., (2007) is followed; firstly, trade payables are 
subtracted from trade receivables and then divided by total sales. 
It is also expected that cash-rich firms (CASHTA) will have lower debt for two 
specific reasons; firstly, due to the fact that risky firms will definitely try to 
accumulate cash with a view to avoid in the future under-investment issues and 
secondly, cash-rich companies will choose internal financing as clarified in the 
pecking theory context. In an effort to estimate CASHTA, we compute it as cash to 
total assets. 
Finally, we consider the firm-specific time varying interest burden (FINEXP) 
for the purpose of capturing the fact that each firm faces different interest burden, 
and we expect a negative relationship between the lagged value of financial burden 
and leverage. FINEXP is calculated as the financial expenses to sales ratio. 
 
3.6. Macroeconomic factors 
An extensive literature is provided by Mokhova & Zinecker (2014) upon the 
specific issue of the effect of various macroeconomic factors on corporate capital 
structure. Taken for granted that commercial banks constitute the most common 
source of external financing for SMEs (Colombo & Grilli, 2007; De Bettignies & 
Brander, 2007) credit supply (CRED) is used as one of our macroeconomic 
variables, anticipating a positive relationship between credit supply and leverage; 
we expect either expansion during the growth stage or contraction during the 
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recessionary stage. We estimate CRED as the annual growth rate of total credit 
expansion to enterprises and households. 
Another extensively investigated macroeconomic factor is the inflation rate 
(INFL). However, contradictory evidence exists concerning the effect of inflation 
on capital structure. In the context of literature, Bastos et al., (2009) find no effect 
of inflation on leverage, while Frank & Goyal (2009) detect a positive relationship 
between market leverage and inflation, yet no relationship on book leverage. On 
the other hand, Hanousek & Shyamshur (2011) discover that inflation generally has 
a positive influence on leverage, this effect however turns unimportant for certain 
specifications of their model. INFL is referred to the annual rate of change of the 
CPI index. 
Furthermore, the interest rate on which companies borrow is another significant 
macroeconomic factor that represents the cost of debt. The relationship between 
interest rates, macroeconomic conditions and firm’s leverage has been thoroughly 
examined by researchers (e.g. Karpavicius & Yu, 2017; Halling et al., 2016; Baum 
et al., 2009; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Korajczyk & Levy, 2003) and it is derived that 
the empirical evidence on the relationship between interest rates and firm’s 
leverage is varied. Notwithstanding the fact that most of the researchers do no 
approach the relation from the company’s perspective, namely that companies 
borrow more money when borrowing costs are lower, there is an exemption of 
Karpavicius & Yu (2017) who deduce that companies do not adjust their capital 
structures based on interest rates, aside from when they expect a recessionary 
period. Conversely, interest rates tend to be lower during periods of recession due 
to interventions by the Central Bank’s monetary policy, yet firms lower their 
demand for external financing. Hence, the relationship can contribute to a positive 
sign as firms are reluctant to borrow money even though the interest rates are low, 
since their target ratios are lower. 
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4. Results 
Table 1. Mean variables 
 
Table 1 contains the timeless process of the mean value of the variables listed in 
descriptive statistics table. As can be seen the profitability shows that the 
businesses are not stable and do not have the capacity, even before the crisis, to 
produce earnings on their spending. The negative average that appears from the 
beginning (1983) just shows the weaknesses and not the business expenditure 
audited. The total leverage fluctuated at low levels from 1970 to 2000 and the 
highest values noticed from 2004 to 2012. The size and growth of US firms 
remains constant during all the years except a rise in size from 2007 in growth. The 
cashta variable illustrates that the asset transactions do not affect the prices, which 
remain unaffected. The tax shield non-interest seems to be used by US companies 
to reduce their taxes owed. This happens all over the years from 1982 to 2014. 
 
Table 2. Correlation of variables 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates the correlation coefficients between the variables used in our 
model. The dependent and independent variables are provided with a Pearson 
correlation matrix. It is conspicuous that there is a non-statistically significant and 
negative correlation (r=-0.0010) between long-term debt values and non-debt tax 
Correlation TDRNEW STDR LTDR AS SIZE NTC PROFITABILI... NDTS CASHTA FINEXP GR RISK LENDING INFLATION CREDIT_SU...
TDRNEW 1.000000
STDR 0.879650 1.000000
LTDR 0.511664 0.041438 1.000000
AS 0.062453 0.070909 0.003102 1.000000
SIZE -0.042418 -0.042097 -0.013061 -0.066045 1.000000
NTC -0.000315 -0.000315 -9.27E-05 -0.000141 -0.078876 1.000000
PROFITABILITY -0.079363 -0.059993 -0.058343 -0.012148 0.013857 -6.91E-05 1.000000
NDTS -0.001925 -0.001660 -0.001045 -0.002592 0.215397 -0.003233 0.000936 1.000000
CASHTA 0.038852 0.035763 0.017012 -0.004673 -0.231644 0.030268 -0.005802 -0.024802 1.000000
FINEXP 0.150862 0.161431 0.025301 0.024714 -0.077546 0.443132 -0.007526 -0.002882 0.020230 1.000000
GR -0.000109 -1.62E-05 -0.000200 -2.89E-06 -0.011557 -0.000438 -0.000149 -0.001863 0.009473 -0.000476 1.000000
RISK 0.000418 -8.58E-05 0.001033 -0.003450 0.026352 0.002902 -0.001826 -0.005010 0.026369 0.003142 0.007645 1.000000
LENDING -0.010041 -0.009003 -0.004829 0.001615 -0.165660 -0.011009 0.002340 -0.058918 -0.197191 -0.016741 -0.003486 0.045880 1.000000
INFLATION -0.007049 -0.006811 -0.002505 0.000277 -0.138306 -0.009550 0.003932 -0.038467 -0.226989 -0.011937 -0.006622 0.181078 0.480065 1.000000
CREDIT_SUPPLY 0.013903 0.011989 0.007548 0.000125 0.217258 0.015339 -0.002738 0.085751 0.254927 0.024590 0.004421 0.022767 -0.604067 -0.558608 1.000000
YEAR TOTAL 
DEBT 
LONG 
DEBT 
SHORT 
DEBT 
AS SIZE NTC PROFITA
BILITY 
NDTS CASHT
A 
FINEXP GROWTH RISK LENDING INFLATIO
N 
CREDIT 
1970 0.2733 0.1799 0.0932 0.0240 3.8002 1.4857 0.1209 13.2078 0.0468 3.3992 1.1550 0.6125 7.9516 2.2114 70.8748 
1971 0.2648 0.1848 0.0798 0.0231 3.8211 1.6837 0.1265 13.5701 0.0483 3.8162 1.1585 0.6299 7.9100 5.0777 75.0801 
1972 0.2617 0.1832 0.0784 0.0197 3.9444 1.7367 0.1418 15.0451 0.0463 3.7318 1.5054 0.6320 5.7233 4.3292 75.5509 
1973 0.2760 0.1858 0.0903 0.0261 3.9212 1.2940 0.1493 18.2348 0.0442 3.7865 1.2901 0.6229 5.2483 5.4420 80.2943 
1974 0.3215 0.2097 0.1118 0.0625 3.4267 1.7044 0.1288 16.4546 0.0480 5.5157 1.2709 0.5479 8.0216 8.9830 83.1427 
1975 0.3231 0.2222 0.1010 0.0698 3.4064 1.5027 0.1224 13.7927 0.0524 6.1333 1.1434 0.3658 10.798 9.2614 86.1370 
1976 0.3136 0.2117 0.1020 0.0788 3.4506 7.8123 0.1284 18.1653 0.0534 15.506 1.3360 0.2788 7.8625 5.4889 83.5061 
1977 0.3458 0.2378 0.1082 0.0781 3.5060 3.0467 0.1214 19.2859 0.0510 9.5546 1.4156 0.1128 6.8400 6.2029 87.0183 
1978 1.3023 1.1973 0.1044 0.0761 3.5430 7.4994 0.1110 22.4531 0.0467 17.187 1.6365 0.4517 6.8241 7.0212 87.8505 
1979 0.3191 0.2174 0.1020 0.0757 3.6510 2.2571 0.1207 28.6891 0.0438 11.242 2.3461 0.6301 9.0566 8.2558 86.7595 
1980 0.3241 0.2215 0.1029 0.2561 3.6022 2.6549 0.0981 29.5212 0.0464 8.3997 1.6352 0.7987 12.665 9.0185 87.4663 
1981 0.3218 0.2109 0.1113 0.2547 3.5652 6.3296 0.0680 25.5831 0.0446 26.097 1.4924 0.3939 15.265 9.3362 90.8892 
1982 0.3282 0.2073 0.1215 0.0777 3.4479 4.3758 0.0294 19.5549 0.0440 21.634 1.6593 -0.1015 18.8700 6.2037 95.5419 
1983 0.3040 0.1818 0.1228 0.0745 3.4130 9.3877 -0.0158 22.8486 0.0493 52.694 1.4674 -0.1475 14.8608 3.9483 94.6282 
1984 0.3431 0.2163 0.1273 0.1140 3.4848 5.2038 0.0276 27.8380 0.0455 10.720 2.5949 0.1047 10.7941 3.5482 92.0732 
1985 0.6782 0.1946 0.4843 0.1035 3.4458 19.725 -0.2502 23.5906 0.0482 167.42 1.5363 0.1994 12.0425 3.1996 90.2594 
1986 0.5021 0.2007 0.3023 0.1848 3.4426 4.4731 -0.0775 21.6925 0.0539 20.078 2.1467 6.21E-05 9.9333 2.0176 89.6848 
1987 0.5561 0.3618 0.2428 0.0850 3.5384 6.3486 -0.0257 31.9560 0.0680 17.748 1.8491 -0.0162 8.3325 2.5512 92.0733 
1988 0.5165 0.2123 0.3049 0.2445 3.6599 6.1551 -0.0264 41.0806 0.0960 21.490 2.516 0.0692 8.2033 3.5009 91.4379 
1989 0.5516 0.2355 0.3172 0.3013 3.7541 6.0851 -0.0630 40.3826 0.1056 33.118 1.5229 0.1663 9.3150 3.8880 92.7756 
1990 0.5602 0.2290 0.3324 0.1292 3.8168 5.3501 -0.0901 38.7646 0.1010 21.230 1.6018 0.2218 10.8733 3.6991 94.1835 
1991 0.5066 0.2117 0.2958 0.2445 3.8282 8.1652 -1.5949 32.4299 0.1131 60.567 1.5871 -0.0532 10.0091 3.3285 92.7757 
1992 0.4758 0.2169 0.2594 0.1845 3.8911 6.8181 -0.0341 21.6130 0.1116 22.4519 1.6250 -0.1369 8.4633 2.2795 92.5776 
1993 0.7463 0.2147 0.5319 0.0814 3.9534 9.3733 -0.1058 28.1765 0.1142 25.5197 1.9161 -0.2411 6.2516 2.3792 96.0009 
1994 0.5489 0.1920 0.3572 0.0626 4.0431 6.7398 -0.0730 37.4100 0.1068 36.5553 2.5491 0.0402 6.0000 2.1281 96.7222 
1995 0.5683 0.2205 0.3475 0.0702 4.0287 5.2205 -0.1152 42.0173 0.1229 42.2790 1.7568 0.3021 7.1383 2.0856 103.499 
1996 0.5332 0.2056 0.3277 0.0652 4.1334 8.3853 -0.0727 47.5943 0.1354 49.0321 2.1673 0.3983 8.8291 1.8255 109.909 
1997 0.3733 0.2183 0.1550 0.0443 4.2277 9.1648 -0.1043 49.2661 0.1370 52.4640 1.8510 0.2650 8.2708 1.7115 112.272 
1998 0.4359 0.2822 0.1536 0.0894 4.1859 7.5559 -0.2237 47.2881 0.1428 36.7195 2.6230 0.1245 8.4416 1.0852 113.340 
1999 0.5622 0.2895 0.2728 0.2221 4.1620 10.889 -0.3662 55.1778 0.1499 73.3415 2.3968 0.2763 8.3541 1.5303 117.205 
2000 0.7126 0.3198 0.3925 0.3906 4.2519 15.445 -0.6946 59.9323 0.1441 145.214 2.6266 0.7787 7.9941 2.2755 114.475 
2001 1.5760 0.7318 0.8417 0.2708 4.2442 9.7609 -1.3591 19.8571 0.1489 123.189 5.4062 1.5531 9.2333 2.2789 118.870 
2002 1.5664 0.3654 1.1994 1.0743 4.3220 10.294 -6.6964 34.8389 0.1510 175.184 4.3980 0.3447 6.9216 1.5351 117.900 
2003 1.4785 0.3680 1.1092 0.7053 4.4185 11.644 -1.3886 71.2265 0.1698 90.7721 3.8692 0.1645 4.6750 1.9940 120.639 
2004 2.1433 0.3989 1.7413 0.3421 4.5202 27.207 -1.6587 106.482 0.1707 123.404 2.3613 -0.0049 4.1225 2.7497 119.829 
2005 1.1282 0.2394 0.8892 0.3038 4.6066 25.797 -1.1897 131.230 0.1726 353.7810 4.1964 0.9996 4.3400 3.2176 129.755 
2006 1.2819 0.4569 0.8231 0.0796 4.6874 17.539 -1.0460 153.125 0.1741 152.2459 2.9589 0.8642 6.1891 3.0722 137.205 
2007 1.5291 0.2194 1.3068 0.2752 4.8022 30.474 -1.3053 157.709 0.1774 202.1193 4.0999 0.6580 7.9575 2.6613 146.052 
2008 1.3820 0.3605 1.0184 0.1653 4.9324 31.440 -1.4273 97.8908 0.1708 178.4369 1.4921 0.2976 8.0500 1.9616 157.347 
2009 2.1161 0.3286 1.7818 0.3673 4.8376 26.190 -1.4767 124.211 0.1872 114.3571 1.9885 0.4211 5.0875 0.7594 171.091 
2010 1.7777 0.5079 1.2669 0.2528 4.9236 21.880 -1.8476 155.692 0.1963 227.0718 1.8098 0.0700 3.2500 1.2213 162.085 
2011 1.1052 0.2419 0.8613 0.2152 4.9857 32.567 -2.7259 159.685 0.1936 286.6734 1.8782 0.2261 3.2500 2.0646 157.348 
2012 1.9496 0.2464 1.6981 0.3073 4.8051 34.226 -1.7173 154.554 0.1935 300.9128 2.0735 -0.1039 3.2500 1.8420 161.688 
2013 1.8299 0.7767 1.0503 0.6484 4.8462 40.148 -2.3828 158.717 0.2007 269.4586 1.6336 0.0471 3.2500 1.6150 176.564 
2014 1.4322 0.3291 1.1008 0.1414 5.1101 39.367 -2.2605 160.511 0.1926 346.3360 4.8132 -0.2116 3.2500 1.7903 183.936 
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shields. Similar findings were obtained by Frank & Goyal (2003), in which there 
isa statistically significant and positive correlation (r=0.0004) between total debt 
and risk at the 5% significance level, a statistically significant and negative 
correlation (r=-00793) between total debt and profitability at the 5% significance 
level. Pecking-order theory predicts a negative relationship between profitability 
and total debt. This theory argues that companies will prefer to finance their needs 
first by using sustainable profits, then through borrowing and finally through the 
issuance of new shares. According to the Pecking-order theory, companies that are 
rapidly developed and have high funding needs will move on to a short-term 
funding that is less subject to asymmetric information.  
Moreover, Pearson correlation provides us information about negative relation 
(r=-0.0424) between total debt and size. This finding is against trade-off theory, 
namely that the bigger the business is, the greater the ability to borrow and 
therefore it can have a higher leverage than a smaller company. According to 
Titman & Wessels (1988), the bigger the companies are, the more diversified the 
size will be and subsequently the shorter the probability of bankruptcy will be, as 
well as the less volatility will be observed in their cash flows. In this way, firms are 
able to borrow from smaller companies. Finally, there is a statistically significant 
and negative correlation (r=-0.0002) between long-term debt and growth at the 5% 
significance level in contrast to trade-off theory. 
We observe some differences in regressors attitude of our regressors in the two 
periods. The effect of the firm and macro regressors cannot be easily extracted. 
Therefore, we are performing hypothesis testing on the individual dummy and we 
also group these dummies across macro and firm type. Concerning the 
macroeconomic variables, credit supply has a persistent and relatively strong effect 
across states and forms of ratios, inflation is significant in most quantiles and 
interest rates show an interesting shift from relatively negative effect before the 
crisis to positive effect during the crisis. 
 
4.1. Hausman Test 
With the regression equation, we will choose the most catalyzed model between 
fixed effects and random effects and with the help of the Hausman test we will 
make the most appropriate choice for our model. 
 
 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 2916.273546 12 0.0000
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 2916.273546 12 0.0000
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 2047.762746 12 0.0000
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H0 : Random effects model is appropriate 
H1 : Fixed effect model is appropriate. 
 
Probability of Chi-Sq < 0.05, so we reject null hypothesis, and Fixed Effect 
Model is the most appropriate for our model. 
 
Table 3. Total debt ratio per quantile 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients of regressors in periods 1970–2014 along with the difference across  
periods. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant ***at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.Wald statisticand 
their p-values in parenthesis. Coefficients of determination R2 and R2 no FE with andwithout the 
estimated fixed effects. Sample size: 132,769, L denotes the first lag 
 
Table 4. Long debt ratio per quantile  
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients of regressors in periods 1970–2014 along with the difference across  
periods. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant ***at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.Wald statisticand 
their p-values in parenthesis. Coefficients of determination R2 and R2 no FE with andwithout the 
estimated fixed effects. Sample size: 132,769, L denotes the first lag 
 
We focus our analysis on the relative importance and the subsequent differences 
between firm-specific and macroeconomic variables, between the macroeconomic 
states of growth and recession and across the three forms of leverage. We thus 
perform the hypothesis testing on the significance of the multiplicative dummies. 
Specifically, we look at the significance of each coefficient, 
 
H0 : δ
C = 0, H0 :β
ck = 0, k=1,…,K, H0 : γcj=0, j=1,…,J. 
 
TDR
good bad diff good bad diff good bad diff good bad diff good bad diff
LTOTAL DEBT 0.0109*** 0.5453** 0,5325** 0.5634*** 0.2061 -0,3569*** 0.8738*** 0.0569 -0,8169*** 0.9813*** 0.0559 -0,8654*** 1.4964 0.0594 -1,437
sterrors (1.18E-05) (0.2671) (0.2671) (0.0017) (0.1367) 0.1364 (0.1007) (0.0579) 0.1488 (0.0095) (0.1419) (0.0092) (0.9234) (1.2325) (1.8368)
LAS -1.28E-05 -0.2623 0.2623 0.0007 -0.0250 -0.02577 0.0003 -0.0054*** -0.0057*** 0.0087 -0.0154 -0.02418 0.0918 -0.0960 -0.1878
sterrors 9.25E-05 0.3306 (0.3306) 0.0005 0.0299 (0.0299) 0.0005 0.0006 (0.0010) 0.0436 0.0989 (0.1246) 0.1920 0.2096 (0.4016)
LSIZE 0.0022*** 0.0003 -0.0019 0.0039*** -0.0025 -0.0064** -0.0017 -0.0002 0.0015 -0.0098*** 0.0006 -0.0105*** -0.0381 -0.0036 0.0344
sterrors 9.96E-05 0.0014 (0.0014) 0.0010 0.0022 (0.0029) 0.0017 0.0012 (0.0028) 0.0035 0.0024 (0.0040) 0.0517 0.0092 (0.0513)
LNTCS -1.15E-05 2.45E-05 3.60E-05 -5.55E-05 4.28E-05 9.84E-05 -8.99E-05 7.27E-06 9.71E-05 -0.0002 -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0014 -7.49E-05 0.0014
sterrors (2.57E-05) 2.90E-05 ( 5.31E-05) (3.12E-05) 2.52E-05 (5.57E-05) (6.95E-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (7.79E-05) (0.0040) (0.0015) (0.0055)
LPROF 0.0018*** 0.0545 0.0527 0.0268 -0.0287 0.0556 0.0101 -0.0267 -0.0368 0.0034 -0.1506 0.1540 -0.0048 -0.1740 -0.1691
sterrors (1.48E-05) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0248) (0.0256) (0.0499) (0.0237) (0.0307) (0.0524) (0.0028) (0.0820) (0.0822) (0.0434) (0.1773) (0.1878)
LNDTS 2.03E-06*** -1.54E-06** -3.57E-06*** -7.84E-07** 1.19E-06 1.98E-06** -7.08E-08 8.10E-07 8.81E-07 3.19E-07 2.48E-06*** 2.16E-06 6.52E-07 6.67E-06 6.20E-06
sterrors 2.03E-06*** -1.54E-06** (1.17e-06) (3.82E-07) (6.71E-07) (9.29E-07) (9.04E-07) (7.86E-07) (1.35E-06) (4.69E-07) (8.08E-07) (1.13E-06) (1.77E-06) (4.55E-06) (5.68E-06)
LCASHTA -0.027543*** -0.0038 0.0237 -0.0758*** 0.0642** 0.1401*** -0.0172 0.0146 0.0319 0.0027 0.0149 0.0122 0.2508 0.1318 -0.1189
sterrors (0.0009) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0043) (0.0256) (0.0273) (0.0319) (0.0276) (0.0592) (0.0288) (0.0352) (0.0499) (0.2607) (0.2681) (0.2983)
LFINEXP 2.29E-06 -2.75E-06 -5.40E-06 1.17E-05 -5.38E-06 -1.71E-05 1.89E-05 5.46E-06 -1.35E-05 5.78E-05 8.15E-05** 2.37E-05*** 0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0036
sterrors (3.87E-06) (4.86E-06) (8.27E-06) (6.39E-06) (4.39E-06) (1.05E-05) (1.47E-05) (2.20E-05) (3.70E-05) (3.08E-05) (3.27E-05) (8.89E-06) (0.0058) (0.0050) (0.0108)
LGR 0.0012*** 0.0104*** 0.0092*** -0.0004*** 0.0130*** 0.0135*** -0.0009 0.0150*** 0.01597*** 0.0067** 0.0120*** 0.0053 0.0238 0.0135*** -0.0102
sterrors (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0471) (0.0046) (0.0427)
LRISK -0.0028*** 0.0236 0.0264 -0.0044*** 0.0210*** 0.0254*** -0.0014 0.0342** 0.0357** -0.0007 0.0893*** 0.09015*** 0.0059 0.1692** 0.1633**
sterrors (0.0003) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0164) (0.01765) (0.0020) (0.0192) (0.0187) (0.0086) (0.0754) (0.0750)
LINTR 0.0004*** 0.0005 0.0001 0.0009*** -0.0013 -0.0022 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0015 0.0029** -0.0005 -0.0034*** 0.0056 0.0015 -0.0041
sterrors (4.64E-05) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0154)
LINFL 0.0018*** -0.0034 -0.0053 0.0025*** -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0015*** 6.51E-05 0.0016 -0.0050 0.0001 0.0052
sterrors (0.0001) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0105) (0.0126)
LCREDIT -5.39E-05*** 0.0031 0.0001 6.20E-05 -8.97E-05 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0010*** 0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0027
sterrors (4.05E-06) (0.0001) (0.0002) (3.79E-05) (8.04E-05) (9.47E-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (8.70E-05) (0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0034)
FIXED_EFFECTS 0.2664
(0.0001) (0.4994)(0.0363)(0.0204)(0.0042)
7 9
0.0030*** 0.0116*** 0.0263 0.0706**
1 3 5
ltdr
good bad diff good bad diff good bad diff good bad diff good bad diff
LTOTAL DEBT 8.47E-06*** 0.0001 0,00009153 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0,0002 0.0006 0.0031 0,0025 0.0035 0.0482 0,0447 0.2511 0.0335 -0,2176
sterrors 2.06E-06 8.07E-05 8.07e-05 2.32E-05 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0027 0.0027 (0.0054) 0.071798 0.1014 (0.1444) 0.3918 0.2569 (0.5618)
LAS 2.33E-05 -0.0002 -0,0002233 0.0007*** 0.0022*** 0,0015*** 0.0035** -0.0019 -0,0054 0.0081 -0.0041 -0,0122 0.0071 0.0027 -0,0044
sterrors 1.28E-05 0.0003 0.0009 7.55E-05 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0014 0.0015 (0.0029) 0.0385 0.0536 (0.085) 0.0073 0.1379 (0.1334)
LSIZE 0.0003*** 0.0009*** 0,0006 -0.0059*** -0.0007 0,0052*** -0.0180***-0.0021***0,0159*** -0.0249***-0.0034 0.0215*** -0.0359** -0.0048 0.0311**
sterrors 6.31E-05 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 (0.0008) 0.0007 0.0029 (0.0001) 0.0013 0.0020 (0.0020) 0.0145 0.0031 (0.0162)
LNTCS 2.29E-07 5.25E-06 5,021E-06 1.14E-05***-6.56E-07 -0,000012056 7.39E-06 -3.46E-07 -7,74E-06 6.31E-06 -9.13E-06 -1,562E-05 7.57E-06**-3.79E-05***-0,00004547***
sterrors 1.22E-07 8.43E-06 3.48e-05 2.28E-06 8.35E-06 (9.20e-05) 7.00E-06 1.40E-05 (1.85e-05) 1.15E-05 3.49E-05 (4.24e-05) 3.36E-06 1.41E-05 (1.58e-05)
LPROF 3.50E-06 -4.27E-05 -0,0000462 0.0002*** 0.0019*** 0,0017*** -8.85E-05 0.0045** 0,0045885 0.000408 0.0034 0,003 4.08E-05 -0.0137 -0,0137408
sterrors 5.50E-06 9.73E-05 0.0003 2.25E-05 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0012 0.0017 (0.0028) 0.0102 0.0105 (0.0207) 8.90E-05 0.0536 (0.0530)
LNDTS 1.68E-06*** -5.84E-07 -2,264E-06 -4.38E-06***1.96E-06**0,00000634*** -5.92E-06***2.79E-06***0,0001*** -6.39E-06***3.42E-06***0,00001*** -4.43E-06**3.23E-06 0,00000766**
sterrors 2.87E-07 4.55E-07 1.18e-06 3.69E-07 8.00E-07 (1.03e-06) 3.57E-07 9.56E-07 (1,13e-06) 7.35E-07 1.26E-06 (1.85e-06) 1.82E-06 2.20E-06 (3.63e-06)
LCASHTA -0.0037*** -0.0008 0.0029*** -0.0378*** 0.0027 0,0407*** -0.0166***-0.0113** 0,0053 -0.0136 -0.0005 0,0131 0.0345 -0.0260 -0,0605
sterrors 0.0002 0.0009 (0.0057) 0.0027 0.0055 (0.0069) 0.0037 0.0053 (0.0068) 0.0120 0.0374 (0.0441) 0.0431 0.1108 (0.1451)
LFINEXP -2.62E-08 -1.76E-08 8,6E-09 -2.43E-06***-1.65E-07 0,000002265 -2.50E-06***-1.24E-06 1,26E-06 -2.23E-06 -4.14E-07 1,816E-06 -3.01E-06**5.14E-06 0,00000815***
sterrors 1.57E-08 1.78E-07 (6.94e-06) 4.59E-07 1.89E-06 (2.40e-06) 1.30E-07 2.74E-06 (2.75e-06) 2.33E-06 7.66E-06 (9.07e-6) 1.25E-06 2.79E-06 (2.83e-06)
LGR -5.90E-05 0.0112*** 0,0113*** -0.0051*** 0.0127*** 0,0178*** -0.0044***0.0105*** 0,0149*** -0.0047***0.0096*** 0,0143*** -0.0013***0.0049** 0.0062***
sterrors 6.56E-05 8.23E-05 (0.0074) 0.0003 0.0002 (0.0005) 0.0009 0.0009 (0.0018) 0.0001 0.0003 (0.0030) 0.0003 0.0027 (0.0024)
LRISK -0.0004*** -0.0017 -0,0013 -0.0015** 0.0221*** 0,0236*** -0.0018***0.0578*** 0,0596*** -0.0088***0.0813*** 0,0901*** -0.0165 0.1495*** 0.1667***
sterrors 0.0001 0.0012 (0.0045) 0.0006 0.0051 (0.0052) 0.0006 0.0057 (0.0057) 0.0017 0.0083 (0.0091) 0.0096 0.0260 (0.0335)
LINTR 0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0,0005*** 0.0031*** -0.0058***-0,0089*** 0.0067*** -0.0082***-0,0149*** 0.0094*** -0.0091***-0,0185*** 0.0103*** -0.0061 -0,0164
sterrors 2.33E-05 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0001 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0001 0.0005 (0.0005) 0.0007 0.0014 (0.0019) 0.0061 0.0091 (0.0152)
LINFL 0.0002*** 0.0008*** 0,0006 0.0024*** 0.0055*** 0,0031*** 0.0025*** 0.0070*** 0,0018*** -0.0005 0.0070*** 0,0075*** -0.0024***0.0045 0,0069
sterrors 4.62E-05 0.0002 (0.0007) 0.0001 0.0006 (0.0007) 0.0002 0.0006 (0.0007) 0.0004 0.0025 (0.0026) 0.0004 0.0072 (0.0069)
LCREDIT 6.47E-06 -1.87E-05 -0,0001** 0.0010*** 2.89E-05 -0,0010*** 0.0020*** -3.80E-05 -0,0020*** 0.0026*** -0.000191 -0.0027*** 0.0034*** -0.0005* -0.0039**
sterrors 5.00E-06 1.11E-05 (1.23e-05) 5.02E-05 3.46E-05 (6.27e-05) 5.41E-05 3.56E-05 (7.23e-05) 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0014 0.0003 (0.0016)
FIXED_EFFECTS 1.1759**
7 9
1.0300***
1 3 5
0.0138*** 0.5165*** 0.8562***
(0.0226)(0.0026) (0.4825)(0.0672)(0.0220)
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On hypothesis, results show that the hypothesis H0 : δ
C = 0 is rejected for LTDR 
only in 2th quantile indicates that firms with long terms debt in low values slows 
down their adjustment speed during crisis. The hypothesis is not rejected for all the 
rest quantiles. This hypothesis is rejected for STDR in the most quantiles, meaning 
that the adjustment speed does not change for STDR during crisis. Specifically, the 
adjustment speed for STDR for almost all quantiles is higher in the recessionary 
period but not significantly different from the growth period, whereas speed 
adjustment of LTDR significantly slows down during crisis. Specifically, and as 
discussed before, the adjustment speed for STDR is higher in the recessionary 
period but not significantly different from the growth period, whereas speed 
adjustment of the LTDR significantly slows down during crisis. Regarding TDR, 
the result for the adjustment speed is mainly driven by that for STDR; this is 
expected given that on average STDR forms the bigger part of TDR. Concerning 
the hypothesis H0 : β
ck=0, and H0 : γ
cj=0, we reject for k=AS in the first quantile, 
for size in 0.7 and 0.8 quantile, for NTCS in 1 and 9 quantile, for PROF in 4 
quantile, for NTDS in 0.9 quantile, for GR and risk  in most of quantiles, and for j= 
INTR in 0.3 quantile, INFL in 6 quantile and CREDIT SUPPLY for 0.5, 0.6 and 
0.9 quantile for STDR.We reject for k= SIZE, NDTS, CASHTA, GR, RISK in 
most quantiles and for j= INTR, INFL, CREDIT SUPPLY for LTDR. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The first thing we find is that the speed of adjustment fluctuated in different 
quantiles and the lagged value of the debt ratio is the main determinant across all 
three forms of leverage, namely short-term, long-term and total, and therefore the 
remaining firm and macroeconomic factors can play a secondary role in their 
dynamic determination. Moreover, long-term and short-term debt ratios about their 
adjustment speeds follow different patterns, having the adjustment speed for LTDR 
slow down during the crisis, whereas the one of STDR is not affected at all. 
Furthermore, we reach a conclusion that between the two states there is a clear 
differentiation of the contribution and the effects of the firm-specific vs. the 
macroeconomic variables for STDR and LTDR. More particularly, macro variables 
increase their significance in the recessionary period, while firm variables are more 
significant than macro variables in determining STDR in the growth period 
variables. Regarding LTDR, macro variables are more significant in determining 
the ratio in the whole sample period than firm variables, and they become even 
more significant during the crisis. Due to these explicit differentiations between the 
two forms of debt, there is definitely no point in drawing inferences on the total 
debt ratio and thus we drop our conclusions on TDR. Since our conclusions remain 
invariable, we can deduce that they are robust to most of the checks. The only 
change that is persistent is indicated for STDR, insinuating that the contribution of 
firm variables to the mean could be even less significant during the crisis. 
Hence, we affirm that the maturity and nature of borrowing itself influences 
both the endurance and persistence of the relation between determinants and 
borrowing, in compliance with the general approach of differentiating between 
long-term and short-term debt for SMEs (Koeter-Kant & Hernandez-Canovas, 
2011; García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2010; Michaelas et al., 1999). 
Considering a case that the firm-specific factors are internal to the firm meaning 
and managers have a determinate level of control upon these factors, whilst there is 
no such control over the macroeconomic variables, our results denote that SMEs' 
managers have very low levels of flexibility for altering the capital structure of the 
firms they manage during the crisis. In plain words, during the crisis SMEs are 
particularly vulnerable on how their capital structure is being determined. 
It is indisputably implied from our study that the capital structure puzzle, that 
was properly referred to as such by Myers (1984), which is a multi-dimensional 
riddle, is simultaneously influenced by the inherent specificities of the following 
contrary pairs: (a) growth vs. recessionary states, (b) large enterprises vs. SMEs, 
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(c) countries' specificities vs. similarities and (d) short-term vs. long-term debt. 
Concerning the practical implications of our study, viewed by a managerial 
perspective, a cumbersome capital structure can be seen as a hindrance in value 
maximization. Viewed from a regulatory perspective, it is implied that regulators 
should provide the context within which a financial environment is capable to 
exist, where better institutions will lead to higher adjustment speed of capital 
structure as well as lower transaction costs. To that end, compared to large 
enterprises, this flexible financial environment is of higher significance for SMEs, 
since the former are comparatively more restricted in access to finance and hence 
more vulnerable in macroeconomic state changes. 
Nevertheless, a main constraint in our study is that our results apply to the 
specificities of one particular country, and therefore conclusions are restricted to 
economies that share similar characteristics with America. In conjunction with this, 
the persistence and depth of the economic recession in America may seem as an 
extreme environment that is doubtful to be observed in developed economies in the 
near future. On the contrary, this specific environment is possibly the ideal context 
to test and experiment with this particular problem in question, considering that the 
two individual macroeconomic states are distinctively different. A plausible future 
research could investigate whether capital structure determinants behave differently 
in economies with milder differences in macroeconomic states and different levels 
of financial integration. 
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